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NATIONAL EM'IERGENCIES AND TAFT HARTLEY,
A NEED FOR INCENTIVE!
Robert Norton*
In 1947 Congress passed the Taft Hartley Act,
which at the time was hailed as the panacea for the
country's labor-management difficulties. Sections 206
and 210 established governental guidelines to be em-
ployed where a strike endangered the public health or
safety. Since 1947 there have been 29 disputes in
which had there been an extensive strike, severe dam-
age would have been inflicted upon the economy and
well-being of this nation. Twenty-four of these dis-
putes precipitated invocation of the 80 day injunction
period by the President. In seven instances strikes
took place after the expiration of the 80 day injunc-
tion period.1  The rationale of the emorgency provi-
sions is to provide an 80 day period to allow the
parties to resolve their differences without necessi-
tating a strike which would threaten the public welfare.
However, the above statistics vividly depict how in-
adequate the act has been in handling the strike
situation.
'Third Year Student, Notre Dame Law School
Criticism of Taft Hartley Act
Why hasn't the Taft Hartley Act achieved its
goals? One of the maimweaknesses of the Act is the
fact that the Board of Inquiry is specifically pro-
hibited from making recommendations as to the possi-
ble terms of settlement. It is limited to advising
the President whether a strike is pending, and if so,
2
the positions of each party to the dispute. As a
result of this limited authority, the Board of Inquiry
usually takes very little time in examining the issues
involved and submitting its report to the president.
3
As a result, very little in-depth analysis is made of
the reasons for the strike and the justifications for
the parties' demands. The Board is also granted the
authority to conduct hearings to ascertain facts and
positions of each party during the 80 day injunction
period; however, neither party involved in the dispute
is required to accept any recommendations made by the
Board.4 If there has been no agreement within 60 days
after the injunction has issued, the Board's responsi-
bility is to report to the President the positions of
the parties and the Employer's final offer.5 Essenti-
ally, for the duration of the injuction period, the
Board acts as an experienced reporter having no regu-
latory (or advisory) power whatsover. Absent any
governmental pressure on the parties to resolve their
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dispute, it is no great surprise that the disputants
often find themselves in the precise position at the
termination of the injunction as they were when the
injunction was issued. In the act as presently writ-
ten, at no time is there any governmental inducement
to mediate the dispute, and consequently Congress re-
mains the sole source, through legislation, for any
positive action to resolve the dispute. While Con-
gress in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, assumes that
reasonable individuals would be able to come to an
agreement during the 80 day injunction period; his-
tory has shown this premise in several instances, to
be an ephemeral hope.
6
The act also requires the President to make public
the report of the Board of Inquiry enumerating the po-
sitions of the parties. It appears that the drafters
believed that such dissemination of the disputants,
positions would enable the public to discern which of
the disputants were making unreasonable demands, and
thereby bring to bear the weight of public opinion
against this party. However, without an impartial
recommendation by the board to be used as a guideline,
it may be optimistic to expect the public to gauge the
relative merits of opposing parties' positions. Re-
gardless of whether the strikers are unconcerned with
the public opinion or the public is merely unable to
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determine which party is right, public opinion has had
little or no effect on the strikes in past disputes.
The Taft Hartley Act also provides for a secret
vote to be conducted by the National Labor Relations
Board concerning the acceptance or rejection of the
Employer's last offer at the end of the injunction
period.7 However, the act does not require the union
to accept this offer even if the union members vote
to accept this offer. But this observation becomes
relatively unimportant when one considers that in
twelve instances where such a vote has been conducted;
that the Employer's last offer was in each instance
rejected by the employees.8 Thus, the attempt by
Congress to have the worker weigh the Employer's offer
against a loss in wages while on strike has proven a
dismal failure. One might logically think that this
failure resulted from union leaders' domination of the
rank and file members but in some instances individual
employees may be more demanding than their leaders.
Walter Reuther in September, 1964, wrested
from the big three 'the best contract the
U.A.W. has ever negotiated', yet his con-
stituents at G.M. called a strike which
lasted six weeks. David McDonald went out
for total Job Security, Greater prosperity,
and Greater Justice and Dignity on the job;
and his Human Relations Commission for Con-
tinuous Bargaining was hailed as a real leap
forward toward industrial peace. But the
giant Steelworkers' Union voted him out.
In January, 1965, Longshoremen's President,
Thomas Gleason announced, 'the best contract
ever'. But the longshoremen struck, nevertheless,
at a cost of $67,000,000 a day in the export
and import business alone." 9
One basic realization about the failure of the
Taft Hartley Act emerges; namely that the act lacks
any provision which might pressure or induce the part-
ies to settle their differences. Rather, the act was
drafted so that if the parties were unable to agree
and the injunction period expired, any further action
would have to be accomplished lpgislatively by the
President and Congress. Our system of government is
built upon the rationale that the individual should be
able to determine his own fate with as little govern-
ment intervention as possible. The following excerpt
from an article by Professor Leland Hazard most con-
vincingly deliniates the basis for this rationale:
"Government hesitates to interfere with
collective bargaining and strikes for good
reasons. It is held to be essential to the
private enterprise system that wages be de-
termined by private contract. George U.
Taylor, advisor to Franklin Roosevelt and
every President of the U. S. since, and Dean
of Philosophy of labor management relations,
says that there are four ways in which wages
may be fixed: by management, by labor, by
government, or by collective bargaining.
The strike in our system of industrial
democracy is a right. It is the worker's way
of asserting that he is not a slave. It is
significant that when American labor sought
to prevent, and later to repeal or amend, the
Taft Hartley Act, which in some respects cur-
tailed Union power the verbal weapon it most
frequently used was the phrase 'Slave Labor
Law'; poignant proof of labor's recent eman-
cipation, for indeed, most of the world's
work in historical time has been done by
slaves. The fact that the average American
worker has more conveniences, comfort,
health, and amenities than any other man
in al past history is not the point. The
worker must be independent, free to provide
his services on terms and conditions to which
he agrees and free not to work under compul-
sion - that is, free to strike."1 0
Many people have realized that the Taft Hartley Act
has not been capable of minimizing the danger of
public strikes and consequently there has been much
literature suggesting a variety of solutions.* The
proposed solutions run from compulsory arbitration to
a national poll of the public. A critical review of
some of these proposals will demonstrate the complex-
ity of the problem and the difficulties encountered in
attempting to develop a workable solution.
Labor Courts
Strikes such as the 1964-65 Longshoremen's Union
which lasted 90 days after the expiration of the 80 day
injunction period, have caused many labor commentators
to propose compulsory arbitration as the means to avert
emergency strike situations. This arbitration process
may be disguised in many forms, but basically it con-
templates the imposition of a settlement upon disput-
ants by an impartial individual or group based on the
facts of each case. This result could be achieved by
the creation of a labor court which would consider both
These solutions and their relative merits will be
examined below.
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parties positions, any possible inflationary results,
and impose a judicial solution upon the parties. 
1
Proponents of this view.point out the efficiency with
which the courts adjudicate disputes between individu-
als by application of the law, both statutory and
common law, to the facts in each case. But in a labor
dispute there may not really be any legal question to
be resolved.1 2 The question of whether an employee
should receive a wage increase is not one susceptible
to the application of legal rules. Rather the court
in effect becomes an arbitrator and imposes its view
as to the most equitable settlement to both parties.
Compulsory arbitration as a general rule has been
considered unacceptable as an efficacious means to re-
solve emergency disputes. Such a solution is destruc-
tive of the very foundation of the basic premise of a
democratic form of government, that an individual has
the right to strike and determine upon what terms he
shall be employed. It also has the effect of taking
the initiative from both parties to determine their
own future and subjugates the individual's right to
self-determination to the good of the country. In
this author's opinion such a proposal is categorically
unacceptable. To effectuate such a system seems to be
an application of the Machiavellian principle 'The end
justifies the means'.
Ad Hoc Legislation
Another proposal which has received considerable
support as a possible solution to the present morass
created by the Taft Hartley Act is that of Congress
passing ad hoc legislation as each dispute arises.
1 3
Even a cursory glance at the present Taft Hartley Act
shows that the basic premise of the Act was that in
the event of the parties' inability to agree, Congress
would take the initiative to solve the problem by
legislation. However, the act itself fails to give
positive direction as to how this legislation should
be adopted or what basis Congress should use to draft
proposals which would be equitable to both parties.
These objections have been largely obviated by an in-
novative proposal recommended by Mr. Richard Givens. 14
Mr. Givens suggests that ad hoc legislation used within
the framework of the present Taft Hartley Act would be
sufficient to solve the present emergency strike prob-
lems. By amending the present Taft Hartley Act to al-
low the Board of Inquiry to make recommendations,
Congress would have an adequate measure as to what
might be a workable solution. He further argues that
with such a recommendation Congress could, by amending
the Taft-Hartley Act, provide that at the end of the
injunction period, a temporary mandatory recommenda-
tion period be invoked. During this period the
157
recommendations of the Board of Inquiry would be in
effect, and the parties would continue to bargain for
a permanent settlement. If the parties fail to agree
within the time specified, then Congress could legis-
late a permanent settlement for the parties which in
effect would probably adopt the recommendations of
the Board.
I5
As was said earlier, this proposal does provide
the machinery to better effectuate the purposes of the
Taft Uartley provisions; but given the changes will
this proposal be effective? As a practical matter,
where two parties are unable to agree and a recommenda-
tion is made by the Board of Inquiry, if one of the
parties finds the recommendation more favorable to its
position; will this party be amenable to further bar-
gaining? Will not this recommendation in effect dead-
lock the parties and require Congress to legislate a
settlement. Congress, in most instances, will adopt
the proposed recommendations of the Board; thereby,
imposing the solution of an impartial Board much like
a form of Compulsory ijrbitration.
Another disturbing aspect of this solution is
that it virtually takes away the right to strike.
Although this achieves the ultimate goal of protection
of the public interests, to deprive the employee of
his ultimate collective bargaining weapon, the strike,
158
is unconscionable. Ultimately, then, this proposal
either imposes compulsory arbitration on the parties
and denies the employee the right to strike; or in a
situation where Congress decides not to act after the
temporary mandatory recommendation period, then the
same inadequacy of the Taft Hartley; that is the lack
of any positive pressure to settle the dispute comes
to the fore.
The Given proposal also attempts to utilize pub-
lic opinion by publication of the parties' positions
and the recommendation of the Board of Inquiry. Supra
we faulted the act itself for failing to publicize a
recommendation which the people could use to gauge the
two positions. But even with the recommendation, as-
suming that the people come out strongly against the
employees in a strike; although this will have some
affect on the leaders; is this going to cause them to
abandon their hard fought bargaining position? To be
most effective, the injection of public opinion must
act in concert with other pressures to entice the
parties to settle their differences. Such a solution
would be ineffective if Congress failed to act or, if
Congress exercised the ultimate power these proposals
vest in it, it would destroy the individual's right to
bargain for his own terms of agreement by taking away
the initiative from him.
Administrative Agency
In some areas such as regulation of interstate
commerce, administrative agencies have been very ef-
fective in handling difficulties which arise. Some
writers have expressed the view that such success
could also be attained in the emergency strike area if
an administrative agency was established to deal with
the various disputes as they arose.1 6 They recommend
that this agency be imbued with regulatory powers,
such as the ability to declare contract benefits as
non-retroactive. The agency would also be empowered
with the authority to notify the public of the facts
in each dispute as they arise. It has also been sug-
gested that this agency determine the size of the bar-
gaining unit and possibly that unions may only repre-
sent union members and not speak for those who are
non-union members employed at the plant.
This proposal is the first which tries to apply
positive pressure to induce the adverse parties to
bargain. However, the proposal also engenders prob-
lems which come with any such agency. Such a permanent
agency may become pro-labor or pro-management depend-
ing on which party happens to be the dominant political
party at the time of the dispute. Thus, a political
aspect is injected into the proceedings which, prior
to this time, was of little, if any, concern. Such a
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change would also have an adverse effect on the col-
lective bargaining climate, inasmuch as each party
would most likely attempt to influence the agency as
to the merits of its position and consequently, place
less emphasis on reaching agreement with his oppo-
nents. Although the positive pressures which could
be exerted by such an agency would be very helpful to
induce the parties to bargain, the political element
which would be presented by the appointments to this
agency and the parties' attempts to influence the
agency would be most detrimental to the collective
bargaining process.
It is also apparent that such a solution would,
depending on the power awarded the agency, possibly
limit the powers of the employees. For example, would
the agency be able to prevent a strike in a particu-
lar industry? Again, would the agency be able .o
dictate terms of an agreement to each of the parties?
Although such an agency would be most effective in de-
fining the issues and keeping the public informed, the
problems which it brings with it (political and pos-
sibly suppression of the rights of the parties) would
far outweigh any positive effect such a proposal might
have on the present ilemma.
National Election
In an open letter to Senator McClellan published
in the Dickenson Law Review, 17 Professor I. Rothenberg
proposed that where a strike is threatened which im-
perils the national health or safety that a National
Poll of the citizens of the country be taken to deter-
mine their views on such a strike. If the vote favors
the union position, then the employees would be allowed
to strike, however, if the country votes against the
strike would union continue to bargain with management
but without the benefit of a strike to enhance its
bargaining position. Although this solution has the
advantage of appraising the public of the issues in
the dispute and possibly arousing public sentiment to
induce a settlement, it may be questionable whether
the average citizen has the qualifications to render
an unbiased and intelligent decision concerning the
dispute. It is also possible that the public, reali-
zing that such a strike could be contrary to the best
interest of the country, would more readily sacrifice
the freedom of self-determination of the individual
workers rather than injure the country on the whole?
Such a solution, although democratic, rebels against
the very basic freedom of collective bargaining and
for that reason is completely unacceptable.
National Finance Trustee Commission
Of all the plans critiques, the proposal for a
National Finance Trustee Commission 1 8 is by far, the
most forward looking and innovative yet suggested.
Under this plan the National Finance Trustee Conmis-
sion would be established. This commission would be
authorized to seek a strike injunction against the
union, where the President deemed an industry-wide
strike to be a danger to the well-being of the coun-
try. The commission would then create two trusts:
one to pay retroactive benefits to employees on
settlement of the dispute; and the other trust would
be composed of the adjusted profits of the industry
and would be held in trust until a settlement was
reached. In this way there would be pressure from the
stockholders of the companies involved to settle since
no investment or expansion could take place while the
money was held in trust. After a settlement was
reached, the trust would be dissolved and the money
returned to the industry.
This proposal is innovative in that it applies
pressure on industry to bargain while not infringing
upon its rights of self-determination and the right of
the employees to strike. Unfortunately, the solution
does not go far enough. It places all of the pressure
on industry with no accompanying pressure on labor to
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bargain. It also fails to provide any sanctions
against a party who prolongs a dispute by making un-
reasonable contract demands. But the basic premise of
applying pressure to the parties to reach agreement on
their own is the way most likely to insure protection
of the public interest while maintaining the employee's
basic rights of self-determination and the right to
strike.
Emergency Protection Act of 1970
On February 27, 1970 President Nixon submitted a
message to the Congress concerning a proposal for deal-
ing with emergency disputes.1 9 Although this proposal,
if adopted, will apply only to the transportation in-
dustries, an analysis here will be most helpful as
indicative of the present trend of thought concerning
the solution of the problem.2 0 President Nixon ex-
pressed the view that our highly interdependent economy
is especially vulnerable to a cessation in the flow of
goods, and therefore, that special measures were neces-
sary to protect the economy in this area. The follow-
ing excerpt from the President's message is a succinct
synthesis of the conflicting interest involved in any
national emergency disputes.
"Our past approaches to emergency labor disputes
have been shaped by two major objectives. The
first-is that health and safety of the nation
should be protected against work stoppages.
The second is that collective bargaining should
be as free as possible from government inter-
ference. As we deal with the particularly
difficult problems of Transportation strikes
and lockouts, we should continue to work
towards these objectives. But we must also
recognize that, in their present form, these
two principles are mutually inconsistent. For
if bargaining is to be perfectly free, then
the government will have no recourse in time
of emergency; and almost any government effort
to prevent emergency strikes will inevitably
have some impact on collective bargaining.
Our task, then, is to balance partial achieve-
ment of both objectives. We must work to
maximize both values. Ideally, we would pro-
vice maximum public protection with minimum
Federal interference. As we examine the laws
which presently cover the transportation in-
dustry, however, we find that interference has
often been excessive and protection has often
been inadequate.1'21
Basically the President's proposal would amend
the Taft Hartley Act to give the President three addi-
tional options if at the end of the 80 day injunction
period, the labor dispute in question has not been
settled and the national health or safety is again en-
dangered. The first option would be to allow the
President to extend the cooling off period for as long
as thirty days, or in the alternative to require
partial operation of the troubled industry or finally
to offer the procedure of final offer selection. The
final offer procedure, when invoked, gives the parties
the opportunity to submit their last offer for settle-
ment to the Secretary of Labor. The parties would then
have five additional days to bargain over these pro-
posals and if still unable to agree, the disputants
165
would appoint a three-member board if they could agree
on the appointees. If not, the President would appoint
three impartial members, who would choose one of the
final offers exactly as presented.
This proposal, in theory, is a very sincere
attempt to preserve the best interest of both labor
and the public interest. It provides for a possible-
partial operation of the troubled industry which would
allow the required services and goods to continue the
flow, while providing sufficient pressure on both in-
dustry and labor to settle the dispute. by requiring
the final offer selection group to choose one of the
final offers as submitted, the parties attempting to
insure adoption of their settlement proposal will be
required to submit the most reasonable offer they
consider acceptable. Such a provision could result
in the final offers being very close to that sought by
the two parties so that whichever offer is chosen,
both parties would come away from the negotiations
content with the settlement.
Although, in theory, this proposal would appear
to protect the interest of all concerned, I do not
think that the actual results will have that effect.
If the Nixon proposal were adopted, any president in
such a situation would ordinarily extend the cooling
off period for 30 days. However, if the strike
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occurred during a period where the economy was in even
a slight recessionary phase; it would not be feasible
for the President to allow a major industry to operate
at less than full capacity? In such a situation it is
suggested that to choose partial operation over full
production would be unthinkable.
This solution also suffers from the one basic
fault which it is trying to prevent; namely, the ulti-
mate settlement is imposed upon the disputants by an
impartial arbitrator who must choose one of the final
offers. Where two final offers are fairly close, the
mandatory selective provision will have accomplished
its objective. But where both parties feel their pro-
posal is fair, and they turn out to be very far apart;
the goal of compulsory arbitration - namely, the best
solution possible for each party - will be incapable
of achievement since one or the other must be selected.
So, in effect, the ultimate solution becomes compulsory
arbitration sans the advantage of the impartial arbiter
striving to impose the best settlement on both parties.
It is suggested that such a solution in some cases
might result in such grave injustice that it would be
better to have the Taft Hartley Act as ineffective as
it has been shown to be than to adopt such a proposal.
Conclusions and a New proposal
Our system is dedicated to the maintenance of the
collective bargaining process in the resolution of
labor disputes. Sections 206-210 of the Taft Hartley
Act are a result of the desire to allow the individual
to determine the wages and conditions of his employ-
ment. However, in attempting to insure the preserva-
tion of this system, the drafters failed to provide
for any positive pressure which would be an incentive
to good faith bargaining. Such external pressures, if
reasonable, would provide an atmosphere which would
allow the collective bargaining process to coexist
with the principle of protection of the public inter-
est.
AN ACT TO AMEND THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives of the United States of America in Congress
Assembled, that the Taft-Hartley Act is hereby amended
as follows, by adding the following sections thereto:
Section 1. Where the president deems a pending strike
in a proposed industry to be detrimental to the
public welfare:
a. Within 60 days of the contract deadline the
President shall appoint an Industrial Fact-
Finding Commission to investigate the problem
168
and report on the likelihood of a strike,
and the issues being disputed by the parties.
b. Upon the receipt of the Commission's report,
the President may obtain a 90 day injunction
against any strike occurring after the con-
tract deadline.
c. The commission shall consist of three econo-
mists, one of whom shall be the President of
the Commission and two lawyers from the Labor
Law Field, one from Industry and one from
Labor. All appointments shall be made by the
President after conferring with representa-
tives of both parties to the dispute.
Section 2. After the injunction issues, the I.F.F.C.
shall participate in all future negotiations. At
these negotiations, the commission shall attempt
to assist the parties in any way; publish a bi-
weekly status report as to the position of each
party.
Section 3. After the expiriation of the 60 day in-
junction period, the Commission shall establish
two trusts. Into one trust the unions involved in
the dispute, shall be required to deposit from
their treasury, an amount equal to one-half of the
aggregate of the monthly dues paid by its members.
The other trust shall be made up of the estimated
monthly adjusted profits of the previous month
of the industry involved in the negotiation. At
the end of 90 days of the injunction period, both
parties shall deposit an amount computed in the
same manner as the previous month's deposit. Any
further monthly deposits shall be within the dis-
cretion of the Commission. Upon settlement of
the dispute, these funds shall be returned to the
respective depositors with the exception of the
situations noted below.
Section 4. At the end of 75 days the Commission shall
publish a report establishing the level of produc-
tionthe industry would have to maintain to prevent
any serious damage to the public welfare.
Section 5. Upon expiration of the 90 day injunction
period, and upon a failure to achieve agreement,
if the union desires to strike, the industries
will be operated at the levels as set by the Com-
mission.
Section 6. If, at any time, after the partial opera-
tion period begins, the Commission determines that
one of the party's position is so unreasonable as
to evince bad faith in the negotiations; the com-
mission in a confidential written report to the
disputant concerned shall indicate why they find
such action to be of such a nature. This party
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shall have five working days within which to
reply to the Commission's allegations and shall
submit reasons why their position is not unrea-
sonable. If after consideration of the disput-
ant's reply, the Commission still considers the
party's position as exhibiting bad faith, then
the Commission shall inform the disputant of the
fact. If the party fails to alter its position
to a more reasonable demand within seven days
after the Commission's final determination, then,
upon settlement of the dispute, the Commission
may at its discretion request the Attorney Gen-
eral Office to bring an action in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court against that party. If the court
should after a trial on the merits find bad faith
in the negotiations, then it may award damages to
the opposing party in the dispute from the trust
fund which was previously created. After the pay-
ment of damages the residue, if any, of the trust
shall be returned to the contributor.
Foreseeable Difficulties with this Solution
One of the major problems with this solution is
the difficulty which will undoubtedly be encountered
in attempting to determine the level at which the in-
dustry should operate. Although the question will be
a difficult one with many inherent problems, the
economists on the Commission should be able to de-
velop a reasonable criteria for solution of this
problem.
However, the thorniest problem with this solution
is the question of what standard shall be utilized by
the court to determine the question of bad faith bar-
gaining in the negotiations. Courts are constantly
called upon to decide upon the reasonableness of vari-
ous aspects of human behavior, for example, was an em-
ployer negligent in failing to provide an injured em-
ployee a reasonably safe place to work? In considering
the reasonableness of the disputant's position, the
court will have the industry's profit, the nature of
the demands made, or the contract settlement offered by
management and the efficacy of the profitable operation
of the industry or the resultant margin of profit if
the parties' position was adopted. Although this prob-
lem is difficult and complex, it is my opinion that an
adjudication of whether a party bargained in bad faith
is within the present capabilities of the judicial
system. 22
Favorable Aspect of the Proposal
In this solution I have attempted to balance the
public interest and collective bargaining concepts. By
adopting a solution which makes allowance for a partial
operation of industry, protection is provided for the
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public welfare while still according to the individual
the right to assert pressure on the employer through
the machinery of a strike. I have also attempted to
draft a solution which imposes pressure on both parties
to reach agreement by providing for periodic publica-
tion of the progress of the negotiations. In this way
public opinion is brought to bear in attempt to pres-
sure the parties to reach agreement. With the estab-
lishment of the trusts and the possibility of the for-
feiture of a part or all of these funds after 60 days
of the injunction period, it is obviously to the
party's benefit to settle the dispute at the earliest
possible time.
Ultimately this solution places the responsibility
on the parties themselves to reach an agreement, and
thereby, preserves the individual's right to determine
his own fate as long as he does so in a reasonable man-
ner. In today's complex society it is not too much to
ask that the individuals's demands be reasonable and
consistent with the best interests of the country. It
is suggested that to allow a party to maintain an un-
reasonable bargaining position to the detriment of the
remainder of the country is a situation which cannot be
tolerated in this day of advance reason.
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